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National Role and Foreign Policy:  
An Exploratory Study of Greek Elites’ 





The impact of the ongoing economic crisis on the Greek state and 
society has been unprecedented. The deep recession has dominated 
public debate as well as political discourse and left a deep scar in Greek 
political culture by empowering populists, nationalists and eurosceptics. 
Cosmopolitanism has taken a hit along with standards of living and self-
confidence. For example, in the OECD’s ‘Better Life Index’ 2013 survey 
the scores for Greece averaged only 1.2 on a 0 to 10 scale on the life 
satisfaction indicator, ranking Greece only third from bottom, ahead of 
Portugal and Hungary, among all OECD countries.1 
This study deals with the repercussions of the Greek economic crisis as 
well, but with a strong focus on foreign policy, rather than society. 
Specifically, we analyse and provide an in-depth understanding of Greek 
elites' views and perceptions of Greece’s position in the world amidst 
the financial crisis, and how these conceptions are related to Greece’s 
relations with Turkey post-2009. The overall aim is twofold: First to 
clarify the national role conceptions of the Greek political elite and 
second to assess the power of the national role conceptions variable to 
explain whether the financial crisis has been instrumental in affecting 
                                                 
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, (OECD), Better Life Index, 2013, 
available at http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/. 
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perceptions towards Turkey as opposed to larger structural forces. The 
context revolves around Greece’s downgraded status and prestige and 
Turkey’s regional emergence and new geopolitical confidence. As a 
whole, these factors combine to impact upon developing perceptions. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of what influences foreign policy decision making and the 
actors that are part of the decision making process. It is these factors 
that Hudson (2005) calls ‘explanans’, which include the most noteworthy 
hallmarks of FPA.2 Based on this long tradition of FPA theory, the 
current research makes several assumptions about the foreign policy 
process and the actors involved in it. On the one hand, we line up with 
the view that various international and domestic factors have an impact 
on a government’s foreign policy behaviour; hence, a state’s foreign 
policies are susceptible to change according to the given domestic and 
international considerations that policy-makers face. On the other hand, 
we assume that these influences are channelled through a group of 
foreign policy elite who identify, decide and enact or as in the cases of 
business and media elites, influence indirectly foreign policy actions. 
The assumption that political, media and business elites are capable of 
influencing foreign policy outcomes begs for further analysis. If elites 
have the capacity to shape foreign policy, then the most urgent question 
                                                 
2 According to Hudson those hallmarks are: 1) Multifactorial; 2) Multilevel; 3) 
Multi/interdisciplinary; 4) Integrative; 5) Agent oriented; and 6) Actor specific. According to 
the author, ‘[T]he explanans of FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy decision 
making and foreign policy decision makers.’ (p.2) 
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is what shapes elites’ expectation, ambitions and interests. Scholars who 
study foreign policy have provided a number of answers; however, role 
theory is one of the most delicate explanations. The concept of ‘role’ is 
not endemic to the field of international relations. On the contrary, it 
was first used by sociologists to describe how individuals ascribe specific 
assumptions and values during their interactions with others (Harnish, 
Frank and Maull 2011). However, the most systematic effort to use role 
theory in FPA was done by Holsti, who used the term national role 
conceptions in order to describe: 
The policymakers’ own definitions of decisions, commitments, rules 
and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their 
state should perform on a continuing basis in the international 
system or in subordinate regional systems (Holsti 1970: 245-246). 
Holsti identified 17 basic national role conceptions, and a number of 
other role conceptions that were unique for some states. These role 
conceptions reflected ‘the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy 
that the role conceptions seem to imply’ (Holsti 1970: 260)  
2.1. Criticism of Role Theory 
 
Despite being a landmark study for future role theory literature, Holsti’s 
work was criticized by several scholars on methodological and analytical 
grounds. On the one hand, a number of studies focused on Holsti’s 
categorization scheme, and pointed out its built in insufficiencies.  Shih 
(1988), for example, argues that Holsti’s typology is logically imperfect, 
as it fails to describe the richness of human cultures, and ineffective as it 
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does not employ deductive categorization. Holsti’s typology was also 
criticized on the basis that the role categories were heavily influenced by 
the Cold War. Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot (1996) observed that new 
national role conceptions such as ’global system collaborator’ and ’global 
leader’ which were not included in Holsti’s typology can also fit in the 
post-Cold War international system.3 
Similarly, Wish (1980) points out two major limitations of Holsti’s 
approach. On the one hand, she highlights the fact that Holsti connects 
national role conceptions only to a state’s international evolvement or 
participation. Indeed, Holsti has constructed his typology in such a way 
so that different roles suggest a state’s different levels of involvement in 
international politics (activity-passivity scale), beginning with ’bastion of 
revolution – liberator’ as the one with the highest participation, and 
ending with ’protectee’ as the one with the lowest participation levels. 
Furthermore, Wish (1980) correctly indicates that Holsti does not 
provide a systematic way of measuring participation or involvement in 
the international system.  
As an alternative, Wish suggested a different typology, which tries to 
include much more diverse foreign policy decisions, not necessarily 
related to international participation. Her research resulted in a typology 
that includes 13 different national role conceptions; each grouped under 
3 different categories titled as status, motivational orientation and issue 
or substantive problem area. Wish’s typology can be considered as an 
improvement compared to Holsti’s as it was able to capture a wider 
range of foreign policy perceptions. Furthermore, the division of national 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that Holsti’s typology included “subsystem collaborator” and 
“subsystem leader” roles.   
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conceptions into separate groups provided information about why some 
states choose to adopt some specific roles and not others.  
Hymans (2006) developed a more compact typology. Drawing on the 
previous work of social psychologists who identified solidarity and status 
as the two primary dimensions of social comparison, Hymans built his 
typology on a two dimensional model including a) the solidarity 
dimension, which includes the ’oppositional’ and the ’sportsmanlike’ 
national role conceptions and b) the status dimension, which includes 
the ’nationalist’ and the ’subaltern’ national role conceptions. 
On the other hand, several scholars raised their concerns regarding the 
analytical power of the theory, and especially as far as its application to 
foreign policy analysis is concerned. Not surprisingly the first major 
objection was based on whether we can apply to the study of foreign 
policy analysis a theory that was developed in a completely different 
field in order to study different phenomena. This inter-field theory 
compatibility issue becomes even more urgent when the theory in 
question was used to study phenomena on a different level of analysis. 
This issue was discussed in detail by Backman (1970) who was overall 
optimistic that role theory as psychologists and social psychologists use 
it can also be used in the study of international politics. He, thus, 
illustrated with examples how scholars can use role theory in order to 
organise and make sense of what they already know.  
Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) address another shortcoming of role theory, 
which is in a way related to our research as well. Cantir and Kaarbo 
identified that the main response to the different level of analysis 
problem, which was discussed above, was for scholars to investigate the 
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national role conceptions of foreign policy elites. The main reason that 
role theorists focused on elites in order to study national role 
perceptions, was that role theory was firstly developed by sociologists 
and psychologists in order to understand the behaviour of individuals. As 
individuals comprise elites, then the theory applies better to them than 
it would to a different level of analysis, such as the state.  
However, Candir and Kaarbo point out that scholars have failed to 
provide convincing evidence that would show that foreign policy elites 
influence foreign policy outcomes, or in other words, ‘why foreign policy 
elites can stand for the entire country with regard to its role 
conceptions’ (Candir and Kaarbo 2012: 6). In essence, Candir and 
Kaarbo’s problematique focuses on the lack of information concerning 
whether elites are the only vehicle for shaping the foreign policy 
behaviour of the state, and if they are not, then how elites gather 
support from the society they represent in order to impose the role 
conceptions on a national level.   
In response, role theorists have highlighted two different aspects of 
national role conceptions (Adigbuo 2007; Chafez, Abramson and Grillot 
1996; Candir and Kaarbo 2012). Firstly, they follow a constructivist 
approach to suggest that identities and role conceptions in a given state 
are socially constructed and hence they constitute social phenomena 
that can be shared among individuals. According to Wendt, a state’s 
interests are defined by how it sees itself in relation to other states, by 
creating social identities at both domestic and systemic levels of 
analysis. Furthermore:  
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[A]ctors normally have multiple social identities that vary in 
salience…Social identities have both individual and social structural 
properties, being at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to 
determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role 
structure of shared understandings and expectations. (Wendt 1994: 385)  
Secondly, role theorists suggest that even if these identities are not 
shared between the elites and society, it is the elites that make the 
decisions, and, as such, they are limited in their selection of roles, to 
those that would be acceptable by their constituents. This explanation is 
heavily based on Putnam’s ideas who suggested that national political 
leaders play simultaneously a game on two fronts, one internationally 
with other national political leaders, and one domestically where they 
have to explain their actions to society, the parliament, their 
constituencies and the like.4 (Putnam 1988: 434). 
2.2. Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
The extensive use of role theory in FPA sometimes creates confusion 
among scholars as to what exactly a role is, how national role 
conceptions (NRCs) are created; who are the main carriers of these 
NRCs; etc. It is therefore imperative to provide a more coherent 
theoretical background of role theory, as well as. To adopt a working 
definition for the term, which will guide us throughout this study (for a 
discussion on the terminology and the conceptual language of role 
                                                 
4 The discussion on how foreign policy decisions are made is one of the most hotly debated 
topics in FPA, and cannot be analysed in depth in this paper. For an elaborate discussion on 
this issue see, for instance, Hermann, 2001. 
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theory see also Thies 2010). Next to Holsti’s understanding of roles 
mentioned above, a clear-cut definition of national role conceptions 
reads as follows: 
NRCs are domestically shared views and understanding regarding the 
proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the 
international arena. They are products of history, memory and 
socialization. They may be contested, but often endure. (Krotz 2002: 6) 
A different approach is taken by Hymans (2006) who defines national 
role conceptions5 as: 
An individual’s understanding of the state’s identity – his or her sense of 
what the nation naturally stands for and how high it naturally stands in 
comparison to other in the international arena. (Hymans 2006: 18). 
Krotz’s and Hyman’s definitions are fine examples of the two different 
schools of thought that divide role theorists on the basis of what shapes 
national role conceptions. Harnish (2011: 7; 2012: 48) makes a 
distinction between American scholars who highlight the importance of 
material or cognitive qualities as the determining factors shaping 
national roles, and European scholars who apply a constructivist 
approach that stresses the importance of social interaction in which 
roles provide ‘reasons for action’. However, despite this basic 
distinction, it is also important to point out regardless of the domestic 
factors (capabilities and identities) that shape national role conceptions, 
all scholars studying role theory agree that national role conceptions are 
also shaped in response to the expectations of others. (Thies 2010) 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that Hymans uses the term national identity conception (NIC). 
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As an analytical tool, role theory incorporates a number of significant 
advantages as far as the study of international politics is concerned. It 
offers a number of typologies that scholars can use in order to group, 
and make sense, of diverse foreign policy behaviours. Furthermore, 
since it assigns specific behaviours to specific national role conceptions, 
role theory is capable to make predictions regarding the foreign policy 
options of states that ascribe to one or more roles. Hence, it does not 
come as a surprise that role theory has been used by a number of 
scholars in FPA. 
In general, scholars who choose role theory as the major tool of their 
analysis do so in order to overcome insufficiencies of other theories to 
explain choices made by foreign policy decision-makers. Chafez, 
Abramson and Grillot (1996), for instance, attempt to illustrate how 
prevailing theories in international relations, such as neorealism and 
liberalism, fail to explain nuclear proliferation when one looks at the 
case of post-Cold War Ukraine and Belarus. According to them, for 
instance, materialist determinism as a realist variant would suggest that 
only states incapable of developing nuclear arsenals on their own should 
comply with non-proliferation. However, this is not always the case. 
Thus, role theory is promoted as a more convincing explanation. 
Chafez, Abramson and Grillot’s work constitutes a typical example of a 
study regarding the use of role theory in the relevant literature. The 
default research methodology for role theorists is the case study. Case 
studies are used for theory building as each of them brings forth new 
empirical evidence of how role theory provides a much more plausible 
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explanation regarding the foreign policy decisions and behaviours of 
states. 
Oppermann (2012), for instance, argued that the shift in German foreign 
policy, especially as far as the European financial crisis and the NATO 
mission is Libya are concerned, can best be explained by the shift in the 
national role perceptions of the decision makers, coupled by a 
progressively stimulating domestic environment. Similarly, Catalinac 
(2007) studied two diverse foreign policy behaviours of Japan, one in 
response to the 1991 Gulf War, and one in the 2003 war against Iraq. 
Her conclusions suggested that the different Japanese responses were 
attributed to a change in Japanese national role conceptions, particularly 
the decline of the pacifist and pragmatic multilateralist identities, which 
were superseded by a centrist role identity. 
A second breed of case studies aimed at connecting role theory with 
other theories relevant to the analysis of foreign policy. For example, an 
effort to connect role theory with diplomacy was made by Shih (1988), 
who suggested that role theory offers insights for the better 
understanding of Chinese diplomacy by clarifying its psychological 
function; explaining the difficult relations between China and other 
countries; illustrating why abrupt changes in Chinese diplomacy 
occurred; and finally, by providing a new perspective on the connection 
between Chinese diplomacy and the expectations of Chinese leaders 
regarding how the world should be. Similarly, Thies demonstrates how 
role theory can be utilised in order to unite ‘theoretical treatments of 
state socialisation in IR with more practical applications in FPA’. (2012: 
25) Thies depicts the socialisation process as a ’game’ where a state 
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adopts a role while it enters a system without prior knowledge of the 
system’s whereabouts. For his analysis, Thies uses the roles ascribed and 
achieved by Israel soon after its emergence as an independent state 
(1948 to 1956). 
 
3. Research design 
 
Unlike the common practice in the field which typically look into 
statements made by top policy makers or foreign policy elites (see for 
instance Catalinac 2007; Miyagi 2009; Aras and Gorener 2010; Bengtsson 
and Algstrom 2012), we chose to carry out a structured questionnaire 
survey6 using the summated rating (or Likert) scale with representative 
members of the foreign policy, military, academic, business, and media 
elite in Greece. There are several reasons why we pursued this strategy. 
To begin with, given our target group it would be difficult to find a 
different source of information. Apart from the media elites, foreign 
policy and business elites might not be as vocal, and hence, it would be 
unlikely to find public statements that would be indicative of a national 
role perception. Also, very early in the course of the research it became 
clear that people were very unwilling to be interviewed. That left us with 
the alternative of structured interviews or surveys. A survey emerged as 
the best option. 
In our study we defined as elites six different categories of people, 
namely businessmen, diplomats, politicians, military officers, journalists, 
                                                 
6 The survey questions can be found in Appendix 2 of the research report (pp. 57-63) see ft. 
1/ 
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and academics. According to Baehr (1980: 226-7), politicians, diplomats 
and military staff could be considered to constitute the ‘formal foreign 
policy elite’, in the sense that their professional standing leads them to 
be participants in the foreign policy-making process. The rest could be 
considered as ‘informal foreign policy elite’ and is of a profoundly 
heterogeneous nature. Here we have people who deal with foreign 
policy indirectly, or what Almond (1960: 239) called ‘policy and opinion 
elite’ or ‘the articulate policy- bearing stratum of the population which 
gives structure to the public and which provides the effective means of 
access to the various groupings’ (as cited in Baehr, 1980: 227). We then 
proceeded with a purposive sampling procedure, which was sent to 522 
individuals. The questionnaire was web-based, and constructed in a way 
that would protect the anonymity of the respondents was sent to the 
sample, while the whole process took place during the period of 1 May 
to 30 October 2014. The overall response rate to the questionnaire was 
41.95% (219 respondents out of 522 sent questionnaires). Although the 
response rate might sound low, it is actually considerably higher than 
the mean response rate when referring to e-mail surveys. (see Sheehan 
2001) 
4. Main Findings 
 
4.1. Findings based on subject-by-subject analysis 
The first major finding stemming from the analysis of the data is that the 
Greek elites trust that the country has both the potential and the 
qualities necessary to influence global politics. Indeed, the answers in 
the questions related to Greece's capability to influence international 
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affairs were quite positive. The respondents suggested that Greece is 
capable of influencing international politics at a rate of 60%, while when 
they asked whether the Greek state can impact the international order 
via the quality of its ideas and its dedication to International Law, the 
percentage of positive answers was even higher, reaching 73.3%. 
Similarly, Greece's EU and NATO memberships were also highly valued 
as tools for influencing global affairs. 
Another important finding is that the Greek elites share a strong 
conviction that Greece constitutes a ’positive’ unit of the international 
system, in the sense that it abides to its international commitments and 
defends and promotes International Law. This conviction has quite 
salient implications regarding the conception of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. 
If the conception of the self is positive, then it implies that one of the 
state’s roles is, or should be, a model or paragon for other states to 
imitate. More importantly though it means that the state is not a 
‘troublemaker’ and, hence, if regional problems arise, then these are 
caused by the ‘other’.7 
What might at first glance seem to contradict the aforementioned 
findings is that in some of the questions the respondents confirmed their 
belief, at least in the majority, that Greece is a small nation, that it has 
lost part of its prestige since the start of the economic crisis, that the 
country's foreign policy does not address global issues, and, finally, that 
Greek citizens do not necessarily want a more active foreign policy 
orientation. However, we strongly believe that there is no contradiction. 
It is rather a statement of belief that Greece can influence the 
                                                 
7 For a sophisticated discussion see Wendt 1999, especially ch. 5. 
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international system, by focusing more towards its immediate 
environment than to areas outside its space vital to its national interests. 
It is furthermore, a proclamation of confidence that Greece can be much 
more influential than its size implies or what its material capabilities 
currently are. 
Moving on to the second set of questions that address Turkey and 
Turkish foreign policy, we can say that, overall, the answers mainly 
indicate the lack of trust and the perception of threat coming from the 
Turkish state. These two convictions derive especially from the changes 
in Turkish foreign policy, and the country’s strong economic growth 
during the past decade. 
On the issue of alliances, it is important to note that the results confirm 
the elites' belief that the US-Turkey partnership is a very relevant and 
strong one (68.5% of the respondents ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather agree’ 
that the relationship constitutes a strategic partnership). The results are 
in line with the popular belief in Greece that Turkey receives a lot of 
support from the US as far as bilateral issues are concerned.8 On the 
contrary, EU-Turkey relations are less valued, as significantly fewer 
respondents agreed it that they constitute a strategic partnership, while 
almost half disagreed. These results reflect the developments in 
relations between the European Union and Turkey during the course of 
the past few years, with declining support for membership among the 
Turkish public, and less enthusiastic pursuit of the fulfilment of accession 
criteria by the Turkish government. Finally, there also seems to be a 
                                                 
8 On this see Ifantis 1996; Couloumbis and Iatrides 1980. 
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strong inclination, among the respondents, towards the assumption that 
Turkey is distancing itself from the West and is getting closer to the East. 
Several points can be made regarding Turkey’s domestic affairs and their 
influence on Turkish foreign policy. The two most critical questions 
asked deal with two different types of changes -- one regarding 
democratization and another regarding foreign policy. To be more 
specific, the question about democratization does not directly ask if 
Turkey has been democratized. It rather aims at exploring whether or 
not the Greek elites believe that economic growth can lead to further 
democratization. The most important assumption is that the Greek elites 
seem, on the one hand, reluctant to accept the changes regarding the 
democratization of the Turkish state, while, on the other hand, confident 
that the changes have indeed been realized when the questions concern 
Turkish foreign policy. Hence, the answers are distributed evenly on the 
positive to negative spectrum (41.5% and 37.9% respectively) regarding 
the capability of Turkey to democratize itself, while a fifth of the 
respondents ‘neither agree, nor disagree’. With regard to foreign policy 
changes, the answers are overwhelmingly in the affirmative with an 
overall rate of 67.6%. In addition, there is high consent among the elites 
that the changes in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the 
ideological (religious) views of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s President. 
The aforementioned results make more sense when coupled with the 
other questions concerning Turkish foreign policy. We can thus construct 
a three piece puzzle. Firstly, it can be inferred by the responses that the 
overwhelming majority of the Greek elites think that the ‘Davutoglu 
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Doctrine’9 is designed for Turkey expand its sphere of influence. 
Secondly, Turkey has distanced itself from the West and it looks to the 
East. Thirdly, the changes in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to 
the religious views of the Turkish President. Based on the responses to 
these three questions, it can be inferred that the Greek elites see Turkey 
as a state whose main foreign policy aspirations have shifted, and its 
primary goal is to acquire a leading role in the Arab Middle East and 
beyond by seeking to establish itself as a source of regional geopolitical 
influence on the basis of a common Islamic cultural identity. Such a 
hypothesis might have significant implications for Greece, especially on 
the perception of threat, and the understanding of Greek-Turkish 
relations as a whole. 
Finally, the Greek elites are quite indifferent when they are asked to 
comment on Turkish foreign policy decisions or strategies in relation to 
Israel and Afghanistan. The argument that can be made in this case is 
that the Greek elites do not see a correlation between the future course 
of Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey's relations with its neighbours to 
the East, or other third countries. We would expect that the results 
would show higher levels of interest, especially for Israel, whose 
relations with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece have been significantly 
upgraded during the past years; however, this was not the case. 
Moving on to the last set of questions, the one with reference to Greek-
Turkish relations, the results are even more interesting, offering an 
                                                 
9 The ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’ refers to a foreign policy concept developed by Ahmet Davutoglu, 
Turkey’s current Prime Minister, some years ago in his capacity as an academic; chief foreign 
policy advisor to the Prime Minister; and later as Foreign Minister whose key principles were 
adopted as the foreign policy of Turkey’s ruling AKP party. On the content of the Doctrine, 
see Davutoglu 2010. 
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assessment over Greek long-held foreign policy strategies, as well useful 
insights for the future of Greek-Turkish relations. The first question 
about the post-1999 rapprochement strategy reveals that Greek elites, 
en masse, have accepted the strategy and they consider it as correct. 
This is the first time that hard data is available supporting this landmark 
change in Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey, which has in times 
been characterized as one of appeasement, concessionary, or even as an 
act of treason by the patriotic and nationalistic circles in Greece. 
The support for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process somewhat 
abates when the question regarding the European Union enters the 
equation. Given that a significant step for the start of the 1999 
rapprochement process was Greece's decision to lift its veto for the 
commencement of Turkey's accession negotiations, it is surprising that 
Greece's continued support for Turkey's EU accession process does not 
gather the same consensus from the respondents, as it did for the 
previous question. Nevertheless, overall support still amounts to over 
half of the respondents, so we can assume that the elites expect more 
pressure to be placed on Turkey to meet its obligations, rather than 
aspiring for the cancellation of the process altogether. 
The data deriving from the questions that explore trust issues are also 
extremely revealing and noteworthy. Looking at the results, the 
undeniable assumption is that the Greek elites strongly agree that 
Turkey is not to be trusted. Of course, trust issues are extremely 
common in international affairs, let alone between two states that have 
been involved in an intractable conflict for decades. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the Greek elites think Greece cannot trust Turkey, in high 
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percentages, across elite groups is rather surprising, especially given the 
more moderate assessment of the relations between the two countries 
in the previous questions. 
Additionally, the answers to the question concerning trust are 
contradictory when compared to the answers to questions addressing 
the perception of threat from Turkey. Undeniably, the perception of 
threat is much lower than one would assume by looking at the trust 
levels. Specifically, significantly fewer respondents considered Turkey’s 
economic growth as a threat to Greek interests, than the ones who did 
not. Also, close to 40% of the respondents actually suggested that 
Turkey’s economic growth is not contradictory to Greek interests. In a 
similar question on whether Turkish investments in Greece constitute a 
threat to Greek interests, and hence, they should be blocked, more than 
60% of the respondents suggested that they ‘completely disagree’ or 
‘rather disagree’ with that premise. Lastly, related to the threat 
concerns, it is important to note that low threat perceptions are also 
implied by the fact that, to a large degree, a crisis with Turkey is 
generally not considered very likely in the next five years. 
Finally, special mention should be made to the Cyprus issue. The fact 
that the vast majority (more than 70%) of the elites consider the Cyprus 
problem a prerequisite for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, 
shows a strong attachment to the roots of the conflict, as historically 
Cyprus has been the catalyst for Greek-Turkish crises, on many occasions 
(1955, 1959-60, 1974, etc.). The answers also provide an idea on where 
the Greek elites think that Greek foreign policy and the decision-making 
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elites should focus if the goal is to normalize relations with Turkey. Any 
such attempt cannot but take the Cyprus issue under consideration. 
4.2. Findings based on divisions among elite groups 
Greek elite groups have a high degree of internal homogeneity, but they 
present significant differences between each other. Indeed, a look into 
the results suggest that there is a tendency for agreement among each 
group, which is strong and consistent enough to allow us to provide a 
vague description of each group’s main objectives and strategies in 
general, as well as, its perceptions regarding Greece, Turkey and their 
relationship. What follows is a concise description of each of the six elite 
groups. 
4.2.1. Diplomats 
The diplomatic elites are one of the groups that assess Greece’s role and 
capabilities in the international arena quite highly. Diplomats tend to 
answer in the affirmative the questions concerned with Greece’s 
competence and effectiveness; they also value highly the constructive 
role Greece can play via its membership in international organizations. 
Likewise, there are several questions that we do not find any diplomat 
disagreeing (rather or totally) with when the same questions are posed. 
It also important to note that the group was rather divided on the 
question regarding whether Greece is a ‘small’ nation, but the 
respondents tended to agree that Greece’s role as a regional leader has 
been compromised by the economic crisis. 
As far as Turkey is concerned, the diplomats were more negative than 
positive on a number of issues. For example, they were very reluctant to 
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assume that a process of Turkish democratization is possible; they were 
also quite suspicious as to the meaning of the ‘Davutoglu Doctrine’. 
Furthermore, the diplomats were more negative than positive on 
whether Turkey should join the European Union; while they valued quite 
highly Turkey’s relations with the US, they were not quite supportive of 
its relations with the EU. 
With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the diplomats’ answers showed 
remarkable consistency. The majority considers the rapprochement 
process as the right strategy; however, the group is split on whether 
Greece should steadily support Turkey’s accession to the EU. Most of the 
diplomats also agree that the relations between the two countries are 
‘neither good nor bad’, while none described the relations between the 
two countries as bad. It should also be mentioned that the diplomats are 
one of the groups which suggest that Greece should not trust Turkey. 
4.2.2. Military officers 
The military elites were quite homogenous as a group and very 
consistent in their positive responses when Greece was concerned, while 
very negative when Turkey came into the equation. As in the case of the 
diplomats, the military officers showed an affirmative perception 
regarding Greece’s capabilities in influencing the international arena; its 
enhanced role despite its small size; its positive attitude vis-à-vis 
International Law and its commitments; and the strength it derives from 
its participation to international organizations. 
Turkey, on the other hand, is perceived by the majority of the military 
officers as a complicated and untrustworthy neighbour. One of the most 
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notable responses is the 55% rate of total disagreement on whether 
Turkey should join the European Union, while only around 13% (the 
lowest among all groups) suggested that they ‘totally agree’ or ‘rather 
agree’ that EU-Turkey relations constitute a strategic partnership. 
Regarding Turkey, the question that seems to have divided the group the 
most is whether its foreign policy under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has 
changed, as all four options (excluding the ‘I don't know/I don’t answer’ 
option), received, more or less, a quarter of the answers of the group. 
With regard to the questions on Greek-Turkish relations, the military 
officers behave like outliers when compared to other groups. For 
example, they are the only group that disagrees, on majority, with the 
rapprochement strategy Greece adopted after 1999. The same applies 
when the group is asked whether Greece should support Turkey’s EU 
accession efforts. In addition, a vast 71.1% of the group ‘totally disagree’ 
with the statement that Greece should trust Turkey, while most 
suggested that Turkey’s economic growth is not beneficial to Greece. 
4.2.3. Politicians 
The general assumption for this group is that it showed a vague 
uniformity, at least in its responses to most questions. It was quite 
moderate vis-à-vis Turkey, as well as with regard to Greek-Turkish 
relations. 
To begin with, the political elites gave quite diverse responses in the first 
two questions which dealt with Greece being a small state and its ability 
to impact on international politics respectively. Nonetheless, in the 
questions that followed, the political elites demonstrated strong support 
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to the notion that Greece can influence with its quality of ideas, its 
adherence to International Law, and its international alliances, while 
they also strongly agreed that Greece meets its obligations stemming 
from its participation in various international organizations. It is also 
worth pointing out that all the political elites answered that Greece’s 
regional leadership role was compromised (in varying degrees) by the 
economic crisis. 
With regard to Turkey, the answers related to Turkey’s European future, 
its democratization and its foreign policy, significantly varied, 
highlighting important divergences of political orientation among the 
political elites. Nevertheless, however, it is quite clear that most Greek 
political elites do not welcome the idea of Turkey joining the EU, while 
they also showed remarkable homogeneity in their understanding of the 
‘Davutoglu Doctrine’. 
With reference to relations between Greece and Turkey, the responses 
of the political elites are very similar to those given by the diplomats. On 
the trust issue, the politicians strongly disagree that Greece should trust 
its neighbour, while the threat perception stemming from Turkey is 
deemed as moderate. It is important to note that most politicians agree 
with Turkey's accession to the EU, although a significant minority (36%) 
disagrees. Finally, the political elites differed in their assessments as to 
whether a crisis between the two countries is to be expected in the near 
future, although they tend to agree that should one occur, it will be due 
to reasons related differences regarding the Aegean Sea. 
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4.2.4. Journalists 
The journalists make up the least coherent group as they show 
considerable variation is several of their responses, although in some 
instances they tend to agree strongly. Regarding Greece's role, the 
media elites have the highest positive consensus rate, regarding the 
perception of Greece as a small state. On the other hand, this group has 
the least positive responses on whether Greece can influence 
international politics. In the questions that ensued, the media elites 
consistently provide the least positive answers, suggesting a high 
reservation with the notion that Greece can influence global affairs, 
either through alliances, or its quality of ideas. 
As far as Turkey is concerned, the media elites do not diverge much from 
the other focus groups. They are quite divided on the topic of Turkey's 
EU accession, as well as on most of the questions regarding Turkey’s 
domestic politics and its foreign policy orientation. For instance, 44% 
agree and 30% disagree with whether Turkey's economic growth can 
accelerate its democratization process; while 47.5% agree and 47.5% 
disagree with the notion that Turkey can become a bridge between East 
and West. 
Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, the journalists strongly support the 
rapprochement process; with their answers being similar to all other 
groups (neither good, nor bad) when they are asked to characterize 
current level of relations between Greece and Turkey. The media elites 
represent the second group (after that of the academic elites) to support 
Turkey's accession process; however, they are extremely reluctant to 
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suggest that Greece should trust Turkey. It should also be pointed out 
that the threat perception is quite low, compared to the rest of the 
groups, as are the expectations for a crisis between the two states 
within the next five years. If such an event were to occur, the media 
elites consider the Aegean to be the most likely focal point of the crisis. 
4.2.5. Business elites 
The improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey over the 
course of the last 15 years has generally benefited the Greek business 
community through the overall enhancement of economic cooperation 
and trade between the two countries (see, for instance, Tsarouhas, 
2009; Kutlay, 2008). As such we would expect that the business elites 
would be among the groups that support the further rapprochement 
between the two countries and that would, probably, be more positive 
towards Turkey. 
Before discussing the aforementioned issues, we should point out that 
most Greek businesspersons have a very positive view regarding 
Greece's capabilities to efficiently and positively contribute to 
international politics. For example, more than 85% agree that Greece 
can influence international affairs through the quality of its ideas and its 
commitment to International Law. Another 85% agrees that Greece can 
do so through its dual memberships in the EU and NATO. These answers 
suggest the strong belief of the Greek business community that the 
country can be a key player in the international arena despite its small 
size. 
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When it comes to Turkey, much as the other elite focus groups, the 
business elites are reluctant to suggest that Greece should trust Turkey. 
However, they don't perceive Turkey as a threat, and, furthermore, they 
support the notion that the economic development of Turkey could 
benefit Greece. On the important issue of Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union that would have a catalytic role on Greek-Turkish trade, 
the businessmen quite unexpectedly, appear, to oppose such a 
development with some 53.4% suggesting that they ‘totally disagree’ or 
‘rather disagree’. 
With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, the business elites basically 
concur that the rapprochement process is the correct strategy for 
Greece, even though their 60% support rate is actually the second 
lowest after that of the military elites. It is important to note that 
Turkish direct investments in Greece are not considered to be a threat 
by the Greek business community. As a group, they consider a possible 
Greek-Turkish crisis rather unlikely; while they see an Aegean dispute as 
the most likely cause should one actually take place. 
4.2.6. Academics 
The results suggest that the Greek academic elites represent a very 
distinct group with considerable differences of opinion vis-à-vis the 
other focus groups, as well as significant in-group coherence. The group 
was, by far, the most positive towards Turkey and Greek-Turkish affairs, 
in clear contrast to the responses of the military elites. Like most other 
groups in the first part of the questionnaire, the academics also valued 
highly Greece’s potential; in spite of its small size. The academic elites 
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suggested that Greece gains much gravitas through her participation in 
international organizations, and they tend to agree, even though less so 
than the other groups, that the country abides by the obligations 
deriving from her participation in these organizations. 
With regard to Turkey, the academic elites agree more than any other 
group that Turkey should join the European Union; in this context, it is 
also the only group that garners more than a 50% response rate for the 
‘totally agree’ and ‘ rather agree’ options. Also, this elite group agrees 
the most with the notion of the changing nature of Turkey’s foreign 
policy change under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. When asked about the 
‘Davutoglu Doctrine’, almost three out of four academics consider it as 
an effort to create a sphere of influence for Turkey; at the same time, 
17%, the highest among the elite groups, perceives it as a ‘zero problem 
with neighbours’ policy. 
The group of academic elites is the one that values the most the 
improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. The academics agree with the 
rapprochement strategy (81.1%), and they describe the current state of 
affairs between the two countries way as positive. Furthermore, close to 
three out four (71.7%) suggest that Greece should continue to support 
Turkey’s EU bid. Finally, this elite group considers an upcoming crisis as a 
least likely development; however, if such an event were to occur, as in 
the case of the other groups, a dispute linked to the Aegean is indicated 
to be the most likely cause. 
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5. Food for thought 
 
In summarizing the results of this inquiry, the following points should be 
highlighted. They derive from the respondents’ answers and, according 
to our assessment, are the ones that provide the most food for thought.  
First, the responses to the questions regarding to Greece's position in 
the global system, reveal the conviction by the elites that Greece plays, 
or should play, a more important and active role in the international 
arena. Most of the respondents agreed that Greece is a small nation, but 
with a disproportionally high capability to influence international affairs 
effectively. Following Holsti’s (1970) framework, we can assume, based 
on the responses, that there are a number of roles that can be attributed 
to Greece. The role of Regional Leader is definitely the first and most 
important one. This role perception is actually consistent with the 
country’s older foreign policy orientation. Another role is that of a 
paragon, in the sense of offering a positive example for other states, as 
most respondents suggested that Greece’s commitment to International 
Law and quality of ideas could influence international politics. Overall, 
Greek elites share a strong conviction that Greece constitutes a ‘positive’ 
unit of the international system, in the sense that it abides to its 
international commitments and defends and promotes International 
Law. 
The second issue relates to the process of Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement, which began in 1999, and continues to this day, albeit 
with less momentum. For years, the change of Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis 
Turkey by the Simitis government (in 1996) has been a contested topic 
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within Greece, both at the level of public opinion as well as among the 
elites.10 In that sense, the results of the survey strongly suggest that 
Greece’s rapprochement strategy’s degree of acceptance is remarkably 
high among all groups, apart from the military elite. Furthermore, the 
impact of rapprochement on Greek-Turkish relations is also assessed 
positively as more respondents characterized the current level of 
relations as ‘rather good’ or ‘good’, even though almost half of them 
replied ‘neither good, nor bad’.   
Third, it is worth emphasizing the level of trust or lack thereof that the 
Greek elites have towards Turkey. Results suggest there is a high degree 
of agreement among Greek elites that Greece should not trust Turkey. 
Answers to this question seem to contradict the answers in favour of 
continued support for the rapprochement process. One would expect 
that if relations are improving, then trust levels would increase as well, 
but this is not the case. Given the importance of trust in the resolution of 
conflicts (see for instance Lewicki, 2011), we believe that research on 
Greek-Turkish relations should also focus on trust-building between the 
two peoples and the two states. 
Fourth, special mention should be made to the Cyprus issue. A vast 
majority of respondents consider the resolution of the Cyprus problem 
as a fundamental prerequisite for the normalization of bilateral relations 
although the consensus is that should a ‘hot’ crisis occur between 
Greece and Turkey over the course of the next five years, this be due to 
trouble related to the Aegean rather than Cyprus. Though, this in itself 
                                                 
10 See for instance Karakatsanis 2014: 113-5 for a summary of the reactions of the ‘patriotic 
left’; and Gkintidis 2013, for a discussion on how local elites in Greek border towns accepted 
the shift of policy. 
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would suggest a degree of decoupling between what are considered to 
be bilateral differences as opposed to the Cyprus issue which concerns 
the fate of a third party, the responses also seem to infer that should the 
Cyprus conundrum be resolved, the peace dividend would be 
tremendous. The multiplier effect would impact positively on the issue 
of trust, the commitment to the rapprochement process, and Turkey’s 
EU accession negotiations, as well as on the wider regional and 
international context, with particular emphasis on NATO, the European 
Union and the relations between the two. In other words, the inference 
is that the resolution of the Cyprus issue would be a game changer. (See 
Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012)  
In conclusion, this exploratory study cannot stand on its own without 
further study including the conducting of a similar survey to assess the 
opinion of Turkish elites vis-à-vis Greece as well as more comparative 
analysis. It provides enough food for thought or teasers to suggest that 
there is much ground for further research linking the responses to 
Foreign Policy Analysis and role theory in an effort to acquire a deeper 
understanding of how national role perceptions shape foreign policy 
making elites and are shaped by them both in Greece and Turkey. In this 
context, this study has hopefully contributed to this understanding and 
provided enough inspiration for other researchers to build upon it. 
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